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Preface 
Caesar defeated the Gauls  
Did he not even have a cook with him?  
-Bertolt Brecht 
Trying to write the preface to this volume and failing repeatedly, I got to thinking about what 
really goes into a Ph.D. thesis. On the surface, it is an easy question to answer – with a clear 
project description the brave candidate ventures forth, collecting data and writing up the 
results for publication in prestigious journals, suffering occasional setbacks but persevering 
nonetheless until finally with only a slight delay the final product is delivered in the form of a 
thin volume of text, to be discussed in a dissertation process and then conscientiously shelved 
in the university library, never to be read again. The newly appointed doctor philosophiae can 
now move on to an illustrious career, having passed one of the obligatory hurdles of academic 
life. It’s an age-old story. 
However, that story is a gross simplification. The last paragraph hides more than it reveals. Can 
a three-year (and then some), multi-actor, multi-site process be summed up in eight lines? 
Hardly. We need to ask what is left out of the account: where is the cook here? Or, to put the 
question in more pertinent terms, what really goes into the production of a Ph.D. thesis? 
I can start by taking seriously the admonishing of some central theorists discussed later on to 
never forget the material basis of reality. What is this thesis made of? In printed form, the 
thesis is made of paper, which is wood chip that is steam-heated, impregnated with lye and 
sodium sulphide (produced by reducing sodium sulphate with coal), cooked under pressure for 
several hours, depressurised and washed, bleached using first oxygen, then ozone, then lye, 
then alkaline peroxide and then finally sodium dithionite1 before a series of process chemicals 
(surfactants, anthraquinone, emulsion breakers, defoamers, dispersing agents and fixation 
agents, among others) are added to make the paper pulp. The pulp is then fed into a paper 
machine, formed into a web of fibers, pressed free of water, blow-dried and finally rolled onto 
large rolls of paper which can then be cut to size. To make the final product, ink (carbon black, 
varnish, drying agent, methanol) and glue (ethylene-vinyl acetate or styrene-butadiene hot 
melt) are applied to paper according to a complicated procedure involving much complex 
machinery. 
Of course, this is only part of the picture. The text has been produced on three different 
computers2, made from a large list of materials, some of them tied to very sensitive issues of 
resource depletion, environmental degradation and geo-political controversies3. The list of 
technical objects required for me to be able to get to work, sit in a heated office building and 
                                                          
1 Itself derived from sodium bisulfite, often used in winemaking, fruit canning and – until a series of 
deaths in the US in the 1980s – to preserve the green colour of salad. 
2 Apart from the odd notes taken (on paper) using a ballpoint pen (plastic, metal, ink etc.) 
3 For example, China – mostly, the Inner Mongolia region of China – produces 97 % of all rare earth 
metals, some of which are crucial components in modern computer technology. 
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type this4 is almost indefinite. Those calling for a material description of social life must have a 
very specific type of materiality in mind. 
What about the other things needed to produce this work? Clearly, there are other factors 
involved. For example, to produce these pages I have read an estimated 12 877 pages of 
research publications5, a ratio of pages read to pages produced of about 100:1. I have made 85 
PowerPoint slides directly connected to the topic, travelled an estimated 60 400 km to present 
at conferences and conduct interviews (that’s about 1.5 times the circumference of the globe) 
and created 28 separate computer folders for my thesis materials, just to name a few. There 
are more, many more. On the economic side, the work is paid for with money from the 
Norwegian Research Council through its RENERGI programme. They get their money from 
somewhere else. 
The private factors involved? Those are for me to know and you to forget about. But we must 
not forget about all the other people without which this could not have been produced. I want 
to thank wholeheartedly all those somehow involved in the production of this thesis, but 
especially Margrethe Aune for direction, Kari Bergheim for sanity preservation, Terje Finstad 
for commenting, Åsne Lund Godbolt for co-production, Anja Johansen for life improvement, 
Aina Karlstrøm for friendly rivalry, Erik Karlstrøm for spirited discussions, Nina Karlstrøm for 
teaching me the value of correct search parameters, Stewart Russell for bike and supervision, 
Marianne Ryghaug for supervision, Knut Holtan Sørensen for supervision under all thinkable 
conditions, and of course everyone else who have been part of the material, economic or 
social basis of this process. 
 
Trondheim, December 2011 
Henrik Karlstrøm 
 
  
                                                          
4 Not all these objects are for the better. To understand this, start with Paul David’s “Clio and the 
Economics of QWERTY” and then move on to the literature on standards and lock-in. 
5 This is estimated only from the work cited in the dissertation. The real number is probably a lot higher 
because of all the reading that does not get cited, even if I allow that I have not read every single page 
of the whole books cited here. 
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Chapter 1: Introductory essay 
Introduction 
Since the high point of state-centred social democracy in the 1970s, deregulation of markets 
and the introduction of market-based thinking have been on the rise in Western democracies. 
One by one, areas of the economy previously thought to exclusively fall within the jurisdiction 
of the public authorities have been exposed to market competition and the logic of economic 
efficiency. This tendency to reconfigure more parts of the economy in terms of market 
transactions and free competition has profound if not necessarily easily visible consequences. 
Among those that are easily recognisable we find such old debate points as internationalised 
production and trade of goods, services and capital, the weakening of labour organisations 
within increasingly de-industrialised countries and a move towards more supply-side, 
monetary economic policy instead of the previous focus on varieties of Keynesian demand-side 
economics. Among the less discussed consequences are the changes to how we view the role 
of political debate in society and the importance of key infrastructure sectors such as 
transport, urban planning or the topic of this thesis, electricity. What are the consequences of 
reducing the space for policy-making to give more room for market actors? What kind of 
governance is needed to make deregulation successful? 
The relative lack of interest in these kinds of questions is also reflected in academic 
approaches. Aside from the obvious concern for market deregulation within economics, what 
is often considered neo-liberal market reforms have been the subject only of some academic 
analysis within other social sciences. Examples are anthropology’s micro studies of changing 
consumption patterns (Shove, Trentmann, and Wilk 2009), political science analysis of voter 
behaviour in relation to market orientation (Kaustia and Torstila 2011) and sociological 
critiques of the assumption of rational behaviour behind much economic theory (Levin 2008). 
However, it is my claim that this is an area that has received surprisingly little attention, 
considering the comprehensive effects of market deregulation on the organisation and 
performance of some of society’s central institutions and the modern way of life. In this thesis 
I aim to contribute to filling this gap by analysing the electricity system, a major infrastructure 
of society. I shall show how the study of deregulation of the electricity market not only raises 
issues related to particular economic designs but also involve a multitude of political issues, 
such as the way scientific expertise shapes the construction of specific political solutions, how 
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different policies configure various market actors differently, how public debates about the 
causes and effects of systemic failure create problems for policy-makers stripped of regulatory 
instruments, and the perception of the system among everyday users of electricity. 
Theoretically, the thesis mainly engages with non-economic theories of markets and 
their stated and unstated visions of democratic politics. It takes as its starting point the view 
that markets do not simply appear out of thin air when a public service is deregulated. Markets 
must be constructed. While a lot of economic sociology has been concerned with the way 
economics tends to presuppose perfect markets from the outset, there has been surprisingly 
little attention paid to the significant amount of work that goes into making the markets in the 
first place. Traditionally, discussions of market deregulation have tended to be of a quite 
technical nature. The technical literature has tended to avoid discussing the underlying 
political aspects of deregulation, focusing instead on measuring such things as price elasticity 
and supply/demand curves before and after deregulation (Tishler and Woo 2006). When it 
comes to politics, this mode of thought has little to offer, even if the seeds of political critique 
often are found in dry statistics. As a consequence, I turn to work done within science and 
technology studies (STS) and economic sociology regarding the way scientific expertise 
influences the production of politics, exemplified by the recent work on the concept of 
performativity. This approach deals with how economic theory shapes market actors’ 
behaviour in amongst others financial markets. My aim with this thesis is to use these 
theoretical perspectives as a starting point for exploring the political aspects of deregulation 
without resorting to a priori assumptions about the desirability of deregulation or the hidden 
agenda of the actors who engage in it. Instead, I wish to show how political decisions affect a 
wide variety of institutions and individuals, and point to a strategy for analysing these effects 
by probing some problems inherent in a theory of performativity without human actors. 
In short, the thesis raises two concerns: firstly, it examines specifically the current 
configuration of Norway’s electricity system and the changes it has been through during the 
last two decades. Who did the work necessary to change the system so radically, and what 
efforts are made to maintain it? To what degree does a system so central to the functioning of 
modern society work according to the original intention of its design? How has it been 
received by household users of electricity, and how has the reform been framed in public 
debate? This forms the basis of a more general inquiry into politics and the process of market 
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deregulation, the voluntary reduction of regulatory power undertaken by politicians in the 
name of freedom of choice and efficiency, and the differing opinions about this process. This 
way I wish to point to the controversial consequences that may follow even quite 
uncontroversial political reforms. Using insights from recent economic sociology and STS, I 
seek to bring attention to those controversies that frequently arise but are seldom put in 
context. This allows me to discuss such phenomena as market adaptation and policy reception 
using methods and theoretical approaches not normally found in academic treatments of 
these issues. Hopefully, this will pave the way for a new understanding of how electricity 
markets function and how users of electricity, policy-makers, experts and the public are deeply 
involved in designs supposedly of a purely “technical” nature. One the one hand, the electricity 
market is nothing but an aggregation of everyday life decisions regarding heating, lighting, 
appliances etc. On the other hand, the aggregation process is often rendered opaque, which 
may make deregulation into a slippery object. This has to be analysed. 
As already mentioned, the thesis studies empirically the deregulation of the 
Norwegian electricity system that started in late 1991 and continued with the expansion of the 
Nordic electricity exchange throughout the 1990s. This was one of the first complete 
deregulations of an entire electricity system in the world, and is to this day held up as a good 
example of how such processes should be handled. The deregulated Norwegian electricity 
system in many ways appears to be a success story. Based mostly on hydroelectric power from 
the country’s many waterfalls, Norwegian electricity is abundant, clean and above all cheap to 
produce.6 After World War II, the Labour Party-dominated government prioritised access to 
electricity at a reasonable price for everyone by constructing new hydro dams for tax money 
whenever the demand for electricity threatened to approach the current supply. However, by 
the 1980s the Norwegian electricity system was having some problems. After several decades 
of constructing large hydro power stations, the government was facing a situation of large 
production surpluses and increasing popular resistance to further development. At the same 
time, excess power in years of rich rainfall was sold dirt cheap to Norway’s neighbouring 
countries. This was bound to raise questions about the economic viability of the current setup: 
why not let prices be set through market interaction and leave investment decisions to 
companies making calculations about supply and demand? 
                                                          
6 99 % of the nation’s onshore electricity comes from hydro power (Statistics Norway), at production 
costs about 60 % lower than other electricity sources (Enova). 
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In response to these questions, the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
asked a group of economists at the Norwegian School of Economics to come up with a new 
design for the national system of production and distribution of electricity. The research team, 
headed by professor of economics Einar Hope, produced more than 60 reports discussing 
different aspects of a projected market based electricity system, from the minutiae of 
electricity price futures trading to the limitation of natural monopolies. In the end, they had 
designed what from an economics point of view was a complete market based system for the 
production, distribution and sale of electricity in Norway. This design was too market oriented 
for the Labour Party government that originally had commissioned the work. They were 
looking for something more in line with the existing system, but with tweaks to overcome the 
inefficiencies of the large centrally governed system already in place. However, the 
presentation of the new market design coincided with the ousting of the social democrats 
from power and the introduction of an 18 months short intermezzo of a centre-right coalition 
in the national election of 1989. Just six months after the election, the economists’ original 
design was taken into law almost without changes. From 1992 onwards, Norwegian electricity 
users have been allowed to choose their electricity supplier freely while prices are set on an 
hourly spot market. 
The adaptation of the new market design went surprisingly well, compared to 
experiences in places like California and the UK when making the same transition a few years 
earlier. There were no rolling blackouts, and most electricity customers did not notice any 
radical changes to the way things were run. The Norwegian system was quickly expanded to 
encompass the neighbouring Nordic countries to create the first international power 
exchange, Nord Pool, where electricity was freely traded across borders. This model was seen 
as so successful that the scientists behind it began travelling the globe advocating similar 
reforms in other countries, most often in emerging economies where the electricity sector was 
not as entrenched as in the most developed ones. Still, the Norwegian deregulation process 
did not take place without difficulties. After about a decade of operation, some problems were 
cropping up for the new regime. While prices for end users of electricity had initially dropped 
in the first years of the nineties, by the early 2000s they were up to their previous levels, but 
with increased price fluctuations (at the time of writing, electricity prices are at their lowest 
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since 2000. A year ago they were double this level.7) Virtually no new power plants had been 
built since the introduction of the new Energy Act – partly due to the existing surplus of 
electricity, partly due to the possibility for importing electricity in times of high demand, but 
mostly due to the very low price of hydroelectricity. While this in itself could not be called a 
problem, it meant that when demand finally caught up with supply towards the end of the 
1990s and Norway at the same time through EU agreements committed to increase its 
production of renewable energy (in itself somewhat paradoxical, considering that the 
country’s electricity production was about 100 % renewable already), government found itself 
unable to entice investors to build new power plants. Also, it turned out that household 
customers did not really make use of the possibilities to buy from the cheapest producers 
present in the market design. Very few actually change supplier in a given year, and most 
consider it not worth the time and effort to go through the necessary paperwork and price 
comparisons. 
None of these problems are insurmountable. New regulations can be introduced to 
regulate prices more strictly, incentives for investment can be set up in order to meet 
international requirements and barriers to market engagement such as information deficits 
can be lowered. In fact, much has been done towards these ends already. The regulations are 
continuously tweaked to counter inefficiencies, especially in the part of the system that is 
counted as a natural monopoly, the distribution grid. However, there is a difference between 
this new system and the way things were handled before. Because decisions in the old system 
– mostly about yearly electricity prices and new power construction – was controlled by 
politicians in Parliament, the old system tended to be cumbersome and slow to respond to 
changes in the use patterns of households and industry. On the other hand the system was 
also subject to democratic control, and parties were in principle held accountable for the 
choices made. Under the new regime, the power to act on specific problems that might arise 
was relinquished in exchange for efficiency gains and - lest we forget - increased income. 
Judging by the yearly agonising over winter electricity prices we see in the media, these gains 
have come at the expense of the public support of national electricity policy. Now, there is a 
certain tension between citizens’ expectations of low and stable electricity prices and the 
reality of prices that fluctuate in response to changes in parameters such as temperature, 
                                                          
7 NordPool Spot: http://www.nordpoolspot.com/Market-data1/Elspot/Area-Prices/ALL1/monthly/. Read 
02.12.2011 
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precipitation, the demand for electricity in neighbouring countries and the available supply of 
electricity from as far away as Germany. 
This thesis attempts to conceptualise the political tension described above by paying 
attention to some factors that are not usually included in discussions of matter of electricity or 
markets. Much work has been done on deregulation of electricity systems, and the Norwegian 
process has been the subject of several studies, from historical (Thue 1996) to more network 
oriented (Olsen 1996) approaches. Some of the principal designers of the reform have 
themselves been active in the debate around the reform (Hope 2000, 2001, 2006; Bye and 
Hope 2005). The thesis owes much to the descriptions and perspectives from their work. 
However, I find that previous studies have tended to discuss only one or two factors in their 
dealing with the subject matter, focusing on the actors behind the reform or studying the 
development in prices and market transactions. The electricity system involves a large number 
of actors, and it is difficult to get a full picture by studying only one facet at a time. This thesis 
is an attempt to broaden the perspectives somewhat, by analysing a larger part of the system. 
Using a variety of data from sources such as government documents, interviews with experts, 
a representative survey of electricity users and hundreds of newspaper articles, I examine the 
Norwegian electricity system from several angles: the designers of the reform, the politicians 
who made the design into law, the suppliers of electricity and its end users, as well as the 
public discussions around the electricity market. These are all important factors in 
understanding how political reform impacts the larger society, and how the changes are 
received by the public. The guiding questions have been: How and by whom is a new market 
created? Who does the work necessary to create markets, and what work is required to 
stabilise and maintain them? How was the reform received and incorporated by everyday 
electricity users? In what way was the debate around deregulation cast in these terms? I 
believe that examining a larger set of issues connected to the deregulation process will 
increase our understanding of how such policies are constructed, maintained and debated. 
The thesis is structured as follows: in the next section, I give a brief summary of each of 
the four research papers that make up the main part of the thesis, explaining the theory and 
methods used without going into too much detail. Then I present previous research into 
electricity deregulation, which has tended to focus less on the types of questions asked above 
and more on technical issues such as price elasticity and energy systems modelling. In order to 
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move beyond these technicalities, I present the theoretical framework that informs my 
analysis of the system. I start with a presentation of theories of the connection between 
scientific expertise and politics, the so-called co-constructionist perspective, before diving into 
the current attempts at conceptualising markets in recent economic sociology and STS. I then 
move on to a description of the methods of data collection and analysis. Finally, the four 
papers are included, where the real meat of the thesis lies. In turn, they discuss the 
construction work done by economists in designing the market deregulation reform, the way 
policy-makers invest everyday users of electricity with certain morally laden characteristics, 
the way electricity users have adapted to the new free market for electricity and the public 
debate that arises when the administration of the system runs into supply problems. 
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Deregulation in diverse contexts: a summary of the papers in the 
dissertation 
Contrary to some claims, deregulation is not just a technical affair, but encapsulates a range of 
political and social changes to a system. The four papers that comprise this thesis explore 
some of these changes empirically through interviews, reading of policy documents and public 
discourse as well as a large electricity user survey in order to capture as much as possible of 
the affected surrounding areas of deregulation. Theoretically, it debates some notions of how 
individuals are affected by and supposed to react to the emergence of a new market in 
addition to the question of how important scientific theory and advice is to real-life policies. 
While there are a myriad of ways of presenting this quite diverse material, I have chosen to 
frame it by highlighting three themes: the professional background of the people 
implementing deregulation, the changes in expectation of how users of electricity should 
behave and the uncertainty that arises when there are problems in a system that is supposed 
to work without regulation. The first of these themes, dealt with in the first paper presented, is 
in line with classical political science and institutional sociology. In order to understand how 
policy comes about it is not enough to just study the documents that are passed in parliament 
– one must also look at who is passing them, who drafted them and who is responsible for 
implementing the policies contained within them. Often, professional interests or specific 
institutional arrangements can impact the end results in otherwise transparent procedures. 
 The second theme deals with the configuration of users of electricity. A tenet of 
neoclassical economic thought that has been much criticised is the idea of the rational, utility-
maximising actor who carefully calculates returns before taking any action. While serious 
economic theory is beginning to move away from this vision of human action, there is no 
denying that market liberalism relies on the considered choice of informed consumers to 
govern companies in competition. Deregulating, moving from political governance to market 
governance, requires users of electricity to adjust their expectations and actions according to a 
new set of parameters in their buying of electricity. In short, they must learn to become 
consumers, weighing prices and switching supplier frequently to take advantage of the 
benefits of free competition. The second and third papers deal with different aspects of this 
learning. The third theme and fourth paper focus on the allocation of responsibility and the 
handling of potential problems in deregulated systems, as well as the role public debate plays 
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in sensitising people to the difficulties in managing large systems. The paper asks whether a 
system that provokes large and never-ending debates can be said to be working stably. 
Paper 1: Economisation - between economics and economists 
This paper addresses the link between the policies that are brought up in governing and 
legislative bodies and the designers of these policies. It discusses a theory known as 
economisation that is currently fashionable within science and technology studies (Calıskan 
and Callon 2009; Calıskan and Callon 2010). Economisation takes as its starting point the idea 
that increasingly, parts of society are subjected to the logic of modern economic theory, and 
tries to conceptualise this development by examining how economic theory moves from the 
desks of economists into policy. The novelty of the theory lies in its view of this movement as 
not solely reliant on the conscious action of human agents. Rather, it claims, we should look at 
the material basis for market constructions, such as the computers traders use to calculate 
prices or the sites of circulation of goods. 
 In the paper I point out some of the criticism this theory has already come under, 
among them that leaving human actors out of the picture makes it difficult to understand the 
ways in which the theory comes into being and how it moves around. I also take Callon and 
Calıskan’s lead in trying to figure out how an economisation study might look when put into 
practice, and use Keller’s (2009) model of how to follow scientific proposals from initial agenda 
setting through legislation and into final implementation to examine the introduction of the 
new law proposal and how and by whom it was received in the process. The goal is to ask in 
what way the possible new system was first conceived and how it could make its way into law. 
 Empirically, I trace the theoretical beginnings of the deregulation of the Norwegian 
electricity system from the first modest attempts at addressing some of the problems present 
in the old system to the final passing of the new free market system. This is done by analysing 
interviews with a number of scientific experts, policy-makers and general movers and shakers 
involved in the deregulation process and/or the analysis of it. The deregulation starts out as a 
purely economic concept produced by economists through rigorous theory construction in a 
number of reports and models. However, I also observe that the fate of the theory lies in the 
hands of a variety of groups with potentially differing objectives and stakes in the matter. In 
the case of the Norwegian deregulation process, the fact that trained economists held key 
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positions in all institutions relevant to the process seems to have played an important role in 
the theory’s successful transition into practice. 
Paper 2: Consumers as professional and political constructions. On the performativity of 
energy economics 
This paper looks at the way official policy documents and policy-makers have constructed an 
idea of the typical consumer of electricity through 30 years of official policy on electricity 
consumption. By examining official discourse it is possible to gain an impression of the way 
consumers are expected to behave (and think) under the new policy regime. This is studied 
from the point of view of Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality, which claims that people 
are primed for self-control and self-audit through the construction of an understanding of 
individuals as solely responsible for their own conduct and the results thereof within a 
particular field. We also discuss the performativity view of economic theory, which supposes 
that once a suitable economic theory for a field has been formulated it will tend to have an 
effect on the practice of that particular field. 
 The paper examines background documents and the parliamentary debates in 
preparation for the introduction of three key policies related to electricity in Norway. In the 
time since 1975, three distinct ways of conceptualising the household consumer is identified. 
The first, a result of the international oil crisis of 1973, is actually two conflicting constructions 
in one: consumers were seen as economically rational in the policy documents, but the policy-
makers did not completely trust them to be so and kept invoking knowledge and moral deficits 
in the parliamentary debates. There was relatively little controversy regarding this framing. 
The second period, starting with the deregulation process in the beginning of the 1990s, 
dispensed with the moral sheen of the previous period and adopted a more pure framing of 
consumers as economic actors. This increased controversy among policy-makers adhering to 
different ideologies. The last period had to do with the “electricity crisis” of the winter of 
2002/2003, after which policy-makers were more interested in technical adjustments to the 
system. To the degree that consumers were mentioned at all, it was as invoked support for 
whatever goal the politicians had in mind. 
The paper finds that policy-makers work hard to simultaneously rescind responsibility 
for the results of deregulation and construct an idea of consumers as thoroughly moral 
individuals, complete with an obligation to make use of the possibilities of the new policy. Also 
interesting is the contrast between the idea of consumers inherent in the policy documents 
17 
 
themselves – as standard homo economicus – and the morally laden way politicians speak of 
consumers in the debates surrounding deregulation. Finally, the performativity theory is called 
into question, as it seems that neither policy-makers nor consumers were ready to completely 
adopt the economic viewpoint in dealing with the electricity system.   
Paper 3: From user to consumer? How households’ use of electricity is affected by market 
deregulation and environmental concerns 
This paper discusses the implicit understanding of market deregulation that users of electricity 
will learn to become competent consumers through the introduction of economic incentives 
for active participation in the marketplace. This consumer competence consists of an interest 
in monitoring one’s electricity consumption on a regular basis as well as the ability to compare 
prices in the market and switch supplier accordingly. The assumption is that an orientation 
towards market solutions also entails an interest in using electricity efficiently, that frugality in 
a way naturally follows the market. If the assumption holds true, this would amount to an 
example of what Sørensen (1996) calls social learning, the process where new technologies 
and their corresponding habits are incorporated into everyday life. 
In the paper we describe how this form of learning to be a consumer might look after 
two decades, and attempt to test the assumption of social learning by asking a representative 
selection of the population about their attitudes towards and actions pertaining to the free 
market for electricity in Norway. The survey consists of answers from 1500 respondents from 
different backgrounds and areas of the country. We construct a market orientation index by 
combining several of these responses and see whether respondents have to some degree 
adopted the role of consumer. In general, we find that people are not very market oriented, 
preferring to stick to their existing electricity supplier and refraining from actively seeking price 
information. They also claim to be well informed about the price of electricity, but do not see it 
as worth their time and energy to actively hunt for the lowest price at any given moment. Even 
those households who claim to be generally in favour of market solutions are not significantly 
interested in energy efficiency. We do, however, find that geographical distribution matters in 
the general market orientation towards the electricity market, where high price regions are 
somewhat more market oriented than the rest. This is an indication that the highly varying 
prices Norwegian electricity consumers pay for electricity according to where they live plays a 
role in how active they are. 
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Against the assumption of market orientation we put a competing theory of 
environmentally informed electricity consumption, hypothesising that electricity users might 
be interested in a more efficient use pattern due to environmental concerns rather than 
economic efficiency. We find that while many already see themselves as being as efficient as 
possible in the use of electricity, to the degree that some see the need for a more energy 
efficient lifestyle it is more informed by environmental concerns than economic ones. This 
environmental framing of electricity consumption is worth looking into for authorities 
interested in more efficient use of electricity in the future. 
Paper 4: When a deregulated electricity system faces a supply deficit: A never-ending story 
of inaction? 
This paper discusses the implications of reducing direct political control over the supply of 
electricity by deregulation. Simultaneously leaving investment decisions for new electricity to 
reluctant electricity companies, opening up new power-demanding industrial activity in a 
region with an already existing electricity deficit and delaying decisions to build grid transfer 
capacity into the region, the Norwegian government set themselves up for a potentially 
serious supply deficit. When a cold winter followed a dry fall in 2002/2003 leading to an 
extreme spike in prices, public debate about the policy choices that had been made flared up. 
 In the paper I analyse the media debate that came in the wake of this “electricity 
crisis” in terms of the different positions taken by various actors in the debate and how the 
concept of a crisis in the supply of electricity became a handy tool for those advocating 
changes in the current system. A reading of 341 papers that appeared in both local and 
national newspapers as well as more special interest media showed that there were three 
dominant factions in the debate, each arguing for different versions of the truth and 
advocating a different solution to the perceived problem. The Gas Alliance used the 
opportunity of a supply deficit to argue for the rapid deployment of new gas power plants, 
regardless of the eventual environmental costs of this. The Renewable Alliance latched on to 
the same worry of a deficit, but held up new renewable energy as an alternative to gas. The 
Blame Alliance seemed less worried about the outcome of the deficit period and more 
concerned with assigning the blame for the situation arising in the first place. Others arguing 
for a more technical fix or even dismissing the problem out of hand were noticeably less vocal 
in the debate. 
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 What was particularly interesting about this debate was the inability of the governing 
bodies to not only do something about the situation (like deciding to build new power plants, 
shutting down industry or rushing the construction of new power lines) but even to give an 
impression that they were doing something. Instead, the most common response was to say 
that people should use less electricity while crossing their fingers and hoping more cold 
winters would not come around. In light of the outrage the situation created, this non-action is 
illuminating: the debate caused by a regional supply deficit highlights the at least partial 
disintegration of responsibility that follows in the wake of deregulation.  
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Deregulation as a multi-dimensional issue 
As shown above, the individual papers that constitute the core of the dissertation each raises a 
specific concern that is analysed by use of diverse theoretical resources. However, taken 
together, they should be read to provide a concurrent perspective on deregulation that above 
all has the construction and maintenance of a market as the main focus. Rather than 
considering markets as purely economic designs, the papers show how we may ask about the 
provision of economic knowledge, about the underlying political perception of market actors 
like households, about the actions and perception of such actors, and about the public 
processes of engagement and sense-making with regard to the operation of the market. To 
pursue this analysis, a theoretical framework is needed to allow a more profound analysis of 
the issues. 
The scope of this thesis is quite large. It is an attempt at describing and discussing 
some of the many aspects of society that are involved in a deregulation process that are not 
normally included in policy discussions. This entails considering both the surrounding 
institutional landscape of a particular regulatory reform, the effects with respect to the end 
users (households) and the public discussions around how to solve certain societal challenges 
regarding security of supply of (cheap) electricity. As can be seen from the paper summaries 
above and the papers themselves later, the deregulation process has gone more or less 
according to plan, albeit with some hitches along the way. The papers deal, in turn, with 
questions of how economists, politicians, households and electricity suppliers conceptualise 
the deregulation. Here, I ask how we can use current research into these issues to get a better 
understanding of the reason why controversies tend to arise. In what follows I present 
theoretical perspectives that I believe fruitfully inform the analysis of the empirical data I have 
gathered, along with an explanation of why I think these perspectives fall just short of 
providing the analytical tools we need to gain this understanding. Most of the theory 
discussing specific aspects of my findings is presented in the papers at the end of the thesis, 
but the more overarching themes that form the frame this whole discussion happens within 
deserves a closer presentation.  
 Before I get to the theoretical framework I use to analyse the deregulation of the 
Norwegian electricity system, I start with a review of current research into the theme of 
electricity markets and deregulation. Most of the work done on electricity focuses either on 
the technical aspects of the matter, e.g. measuring energy efficiency in buildings or load 
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capacities in the transmission grid, or on aspects related to consumption, such as household 
electricity use and price elasticity. My claim is that while this is both useful and interesting 
work for those looking to understand how different technical solutions produce different types 
of use or to what degree and under which circumstances a more efficient use of electricity is 
feasible, it is not sufficient to understand the political complexity I attempt to tackle in this 
thesis. That is why I attempt to bring the more technical considerations into a wider context by 
considering theories about the importance of examining the role of scientific expertise in the 
formulation of politics as well as theories relating to how market designs have a profound 
influence on the political sphere8. I discuss the theories of the interaction between science and 
politics by looking at theories of the co-production of science and politics (Jasanoff 2004), a 
recent attempt to explain how these two fields interact and co-create each other. Co-
construction as a concept offers a reason to look closely at how policy is designed by policy-
makers with input from experts, because design choices tend to implant specific modes of 
thought and actions at later stages. I then look at one current attempt to use this type of 
thinking to understand economists’ influence in policy matters, the concepts of economisation 
(Calıskan and Callon 2009; Calıskan and Callon 2010) and performativity (MacKenzie, Muniesa, 
and Siu 2007). I discuss how these concepts depend on a very specific idea of what a market is, 
and why this is not necessarily useful for all types of markets. At the end of this last discussion I 
present what I believe needs to be amended to that theory to make it work as an analytical 
tool for understanding how deregulation comes about and what it results in. 
Previous studies of electricity deregulation 
Tishler and Woo (2006) contend that research on electricity deregulation has been focused 
mainly on three lines of enquiry: market architecture, economic efficiency and trading 
efficiency. While these are important questions within the field of electricity economics, they 
tend to take the deregulation process, the messy political and rhetorical work required to 
make it happen in the first place, somewhat for granted. This is clearly illustrated in the book 
Electricity Deregulation edited by Griffin and Puller (2005), where all contributors are 
exclusively interested in tweaking the market design when it shows signs of trouble. The 
deregulation itself is a given.  
                                                          
8 As Callon puts it, “the pervasiveness of today’s markets is attended by a profound redefinition of the 
role of politics and its institutions in our societies” (Callon 2007:139) 
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 Available analysis of electricity deregulation processes mainly concern some sort of 
comparison: either among different regions of the world or by comparing the electricity 
system before and after deregulation. The papers analyse outcomes of electricity deregulation 
in particular parts of the world by comparing them to previous efforts in other places, such as 
recent work done on the feasibility of electricity deregulation in Hong Kong when results from 
other small countries are dubious (Thomas 2006) or whether there is something to learn from 
telecommunications deregulations for future electricity deregulations (Pollitt 2010). Or they 
present comprehensive analyses of regions, such as comparisons within the whole of the EU 
(Green 2006), the whole of the OECD (Al-sunaidy and Green 2006) or even comparing regions 
and countries (UK, Norway, Alberta and California, in the case of Woo, Lloyd, & Tishler, 2003). 
Some work is more concerned with the effects of deregulation, attempting to judge the merits 
of reform by analysing the situation before and after deregulation. Examples of this can be 
found for reforms like the ones in Turkey (Dastan 2011), Texas (Zarnikau and Hallett 2008) or 
the important “early adopter” cases of California (Blumstein, Friedman, and Green 2002) and 
the UK (Thomas 2004). 
These contributions represent different methodologies and approaches to the study of 
electricity deregulation using a comparative approach. Some of this body of work is quite 
critical of deregulation; others are more purely descriptive in their treatment of the subject. 
There is a lively debate on the feasibility of electricity market deregulation itself. However, one 
thing they have in common is a certain narrowness of scope. There is also a rather technical 
aspect to much of this research, perhaps following from the concern with changes in prices (Li 
and Flynn 2006) or problems of market domination (J. V. Kumar and Kumar 2010). 
Some effort has been put into tracing the way policies regulating electricity markets 
and discourses around their implementation shape and influence the process. For example, 
Hirsh (1999) draws on themes from political science, history and the sociology of technological 
systems to highlight the way politicians and power utility managers adopt a specific ideological 
framework to conceive of the electricity system as something that could be split into a natural 
monopoly and a free market. In line with this, Högselius & Kaijser (2010) identify a set of 
stakeholders and trace their work in several different arenas to influence the making of the 
deregulation of the Swedish electricity system. Simmons (2008) analyses the media discourse 
around a deregulation process in Canada, showing how the media plays an important role in 
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the legitimising of deregulation. However, even if these are examples of a more contextually 
sensitive approach to the study of deregulation processes, they remain exceptions to the rule 
in a field dominated by statistical modelling and price calculations. 
One noteworthy factor missing from all this discussion of market design, electricity 
suppliers and efficient trading is the end user of electricity. There are plenty of analyses of 
price and income elasticises in households (see for example Dergiades & Tsoulfidis, 2008; 
Filippini, 2010; Narayan & Smyth, 2008; Silk & Joutz, 1997; Zarnikau & Hallett, 2008), and also 
work on the relationship between energy consumption, income and prices (Asafu-Adjaye 
2000; Yuan, Liu, and Wu 2010). This work, however, is not concerned with how households’ 
perception of the deregulated market might influence their actions in it, nor does it for that 
matter question the assumption that electricity users are rational consumers making choices 
based on best available price information. The survey paper (no. 3) is partly an attempt to 
rectify this by taking into consideration the conceptual framing of the electricity market on the 
part of the households that actually buy and use electricity. 
This is not to imply that no sort of non-technical research into electricity markets 
exists. On the contrary, there is a rich field of more practise oriented research on household 
electricity use, focusing on social and cultural explanations of private electricity use. For 
example, research into everyday electricity users’ behaviour patterns (Aune 1997, 2007; Shove 
2003) demonstrates how individual definitions of comfort, cleanliness and convenience 
influence users’ consumption patterns and understanding of their own relation to the 
electricity system. Showering, laundering and indoor climate control are not value-free 
parameters in a calculation of the optimal use of electricity, but activities that are imbued with 
meaning and a host of associations related to non-economic rationalities. Similarly, by 
referring to the concept of domestication (Sørensen, Aune, and Hatling 2000; Aune 2007) 
these scholars have analysed how our material surroundings affect our willingness and ability 
to assess our lifestyles and potentially change it. These studies emphasise the non-economic 
aspects of electricity use, even making a note of how different aesthetic preferences can be 
more important than economic considerations in these matters (Berker and Gansmo 2010). 
The research reviewed so far is useful for understanding how there are different ways 
of conceptualising people’s relation to the electricity market, and that this is not necessarily 
connected to the more system oriented analysis of the electricity sector. Households make 
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their own accounts of their use of electricity, often informed by other concerns than those of 
efficiency or economic rationality. Still, in the study of electricity market deregulation, the 
anthropologically informed study of everyday habits is a bit too near-sighted for grasping the 
more political aspects of the matter at hand. A lot of the discussion of deregulation takes a 
stance for or against specific policies, and have a keen understanding of the consequences of 
different policy choices, but there is surprisingly little analysis of broader political contexts. Of 
course, the configuration of everyday life is political, but there are few scholarly attempts to 
link the diverse dimensions of such large-scale political processes as deregulation reforms: the 
production of meaning in the media, the professional and political background of those 
working on deregulation, the parliamentary debates, and so forth.  
By studying how economists played a role in the Norwegian electricity deregulation 
and how this reform was perceived by households and debated in Parliament and the media, I 
hope to improve the understanding of how deregulation should be understood through its 
socio-political environment. However, in order to get to that point, we need an understanding 
of how scientific expertise influences the sphere of politics, and vice versa. In the next section, 
I will present theories of science and politics that move away from a static conception of 
scientific influence over policy as a one-way street and towards a more integrated approach, 
contained in the concept of co-production of science and politics (Jasanoff 2004). The co-
productionist perspective has come to be central in much of current STS thought, but I will 
argue that there is a possible tension between it and the new theory of economisation, which 
deals with how academic economic work moves into the world of real policy. 
Expanding the study of electricity market deregulation 
Traditional accounts of how science plays a role in the formulation of policy has tended to 
accept a linear model of knowledge transfer, where science in a way dictates the possibilities 
for making policy: “Science would educate decision makers and raise public awareness, and 
this awareness in turn would lead to informed and rational policy choices – so conventional 
wisdom asserted”, as Jasanoff and Martello (2004:336) put it. This model seems to embrace 
the notion that scientific advice is somehow neutral and apolitical, and the linear direction of 
this mode of thought implies that science is unaffected by politics. Within the STS field, 
however, there is a long-standing tradition of critically examining such models (Jasanoff et al. 
1995). A number of studies have shown that the connection between science and politics is far 
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more complex (Herrick and Jamieson 1995; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). Some of this criticism 
can be found within other fields as well, like in recent efforts in political science (Keller 2009) 
or cultural studies (Hess 1999). 
 The critics of the linear model point out that there is little in the empirical data that 
supports a linear model of knowledge transfer from the world of science to that of politics. 
Rather, the exchange is fluid and two-way: scientific questions are often formulated in 
response to specific political problems or whatever is on the current political agenda, and 
scientists often serve as advisors on political matters, as members of governmental boards or 
authors of requested recommendatory papers on various issues. Similarly, scientists are not 
without political views and priorities. This complicated exchange between the allegedly 
separate spheres of science and politics requires a more nuanced analysis than a simple linear 
model, or the idea that science is somehow completely separated from politics and able to 
“speak truth to power”, as the convention would have it (Jasanoff 2003). A term that can 
provide such an analysis is the notion of co-production (Jasanoff 2004), which offers a way of 
analysing the construction and maintenance of political order in terms of the work done by 
various actors to create and maintain it as well as a sensitivity towards the concrete, material 
configurations that make this possible. Co-production happens along four pathways, which 
occur in various combinations and with differing strength according to the context: making 
identities, making institutions, making discourses and making representations. These pathways 
play a crucial role in the delegation of power between the various acts of agenda setting and 
policy implementation that make up modern politics. They all play their part in maintaining the 
tenuous order established by science and politics in tandem (Ryghaug 2011).9 Adopting a co-
productionist perspective requires one to examine the scientific advice that is invoked in 
matters of politics (and what matters are not?) to see how it was produced, who is producing 
it and in what way it is being invoked. As scientists are increasingly involved in advocating 
policy themselves, this becomes a question of utmost importance (Hajer 2009). Co-production 
has proven to be useful in the study of many different phenomena, such as climate change (C. 
Miller 2004), biomedicine (Felt, Fochler, and Winkler 2009) and the use of science in the 
courtroom (Jasanoff 1995). Its focus on combining the study of institutions, identities, 
representation and discourse resonates well with my analysis of the construction of the 
                                                          
9 They are not always so well aligned, and there are moments of destabilisation along the way. The so-
called “Climategate” controversy can attest to this (Ryghaug and Skjølsvold 2010). 
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Norwegian electricity market, the surrounding media discourse and representations of 
electricity users by policy-makers. It is, however, not the only way to conceptualise these 
interactions. 
 Co-productionist theory emphasises the reciprocal nature of the relationship between 
scientific knowledge and political frameworks – in modern society one is impossible without 
the other. A different take on the relationship between science and politics can be found in 
another strand of recent STS thought, working with the concept of performativity. This 
approach considers the influence of economic theory on the operations of markets and 
connected parts of the world of finance (Callon 1998; MacKenzie 2006; Muniesa, Millo, and 
Callon 2007; Beunza, Hardie, and MacKenzie 2006; Beunza and Stark 2002). This body of work 
claims that economic theory may, through building ideal, simplified models and producing 
analytical techniques that can be transferred to everyday practice, actually help transform the 
phenomena described by the theoretical models into something more closely resembling the 
theoretical model. In a way, the theory comes to somehow perform reality.  
While performativity originally was coined as a general concept in post-structuralist 
theory, which in STS has been applied to analysis of the effects of technosciences (see for 
example Latour 2005; Law 2004), it has also been used to study how economic theories have 
affected the world. One example is MacKenzie’s (2006) study of how economists at the 
University of Chicago in the 1960s took their new theories of the correct valuation of company 
stock prices into the stock market, setting up trading companies that used these new theories 
to great effect. Seeing that the economists’ theoretical models of optimal pricing were more 
efficient than the rules of thumb they were using at the time, other traders started to employ 
the new theoretical tools, which in turn meant that the stock market started to resemble the 
ideal model that was the starting point of pricing theory. This effect, MacKenzie claims, is at 
least partial proof that the performativity of economic theory can influence reality. 
 Here, a question arises: if the performativity thesis describes how a specific scientific 
theory comes to shape the world it studies, how is this different from a linear model of 
knowledge transfer from science to society? One way the performativity theorists seek to 
avoid this problem is to emphasize the material aspects of the process. They claim that 
economic theorists produce tools of a very specific nature called “calculative devices” (Callon, 
Millo, and Muniesa 2007). Such devices include the algorithms and technical apparatus of 
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market exchanges – which are then used by the market actors to conduct transactions and 
make necessary calculations and valuations. This emphasis squares the performativity thesis 
nicely with much of STS thought, which is often concerned with exploring the material basis of 
social arrangements (Garcia-Parpet 2007; MacKenzie 2009). Following market actors around as 
they trade stock using complex computer algorithms, compare prices at village market squares 
or test out new economic theories in the marketplace can be seen as examples of such techno-
semiotic analysis. As Mackenzie points out, “what is perhaps most characteristic of a 
perspective rooted in the social studies of science and technology is its concern with the 
materiality of markets” (MacKenzie, 2009:2). The latest iteration of the performativity thesis as 
applied to markets, called economisation (Calıskan and Callon 2009; Calıskan and Callon 2010), 
goes one step further to call for studies of market interactions without reference to the human 
actors that make up the market in the first place. 
However, even if the performativity thesis avoids the pitfalls of linear knowledge 
transfer, there is still the question of how it deals with its subject matter, markets. So far, most 
performativity research has been done with an empirical focus on highly specialised arenas 
where most of the actors share a common understanding of what the market in question 
consists of and should be – trading floors, auction houses, securities traders, stock exchanges 
etc. The question remains whether this type of theory can prove useful in the context of non-
technical markets where the involved actors are not trained to take into account the latest 
theoretical developments or use specialised calculative devices, as is the case with the market 
for electricity. A look at the discussion of how we should understand markets and market 
interactions may help to clarify how performativity can help inform the analysis of the 
deregulation process. 
Making sense of markets: Embeddedness, performativity and 
enactment 
What is the role of a market? Depending on whom you ask it can be described as everything 
from a simple mechanism for distributing information about the current supply and demand of 
a given commodity, resulting in a price that both buyers and sellers find satisfactory, to an 
impersonal and unstoppable force that reduces human interaction to mere calculations and 
conceals unequal power relations. Social science disciplines tend to conceptualise markets in 
different ways. Economists tend to view them as fundamental arrangements of human 
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interaction that have been with us since the dawn of human civilisation. Others point out the 
historical contingency of what we today would identify as markets, and claim that there is 
nothing “natural” or “eternal” about the market mechanism. The debate is not only about how 
to characterise the historical nature of markets, but also on what they actually are and do. 
In STS treatments of markets there is a tendency to overlook the underlying definition 
of markets, thereby not questioning some of the basic assumptions about the actors involved 
in market operations. There is a conscious unwillingness to define what a market, or indeed 
any part of the economy, really is: “Emphasis is put […] not on any substantive definition of 
what “economic” should mean” (Muniesa, Millo, & Callon, 2007:3). In addition to the usual 
market descriptions of supply and demand, the flow of information and the main market 
actors, Calıskan and Callon list a whole host of objects to include in the description of market 
matters: “rules and conventions; technical devices; metereological systems; logistical 
infrastructures; texts; discourses and narratives” (Calıskan & Callon, 2010:3), and so on. This 
makes for a very loose definition of what markets actually do. While it covers all the bases, the 
unwillingness to prioritise factors means there is a risk of losing sight of the more politicised 
function of markets in modern capitalist democracies, not least related to the often 
controversial acts of deregulation. The authors concede that “markets delimit and construct a 
space of confrontation and power struggles”, but this space exists only within the market 
transaction itself, “until the terms of the transaction are peacefully determined by pricing 
mechanisms” (Calıskan & Callon, 2010:3). In a way, they wish to avoid extrapolating questions 
of power and politics from the market situation itself.  
 This reluctance to assign political value to the actions of market actors in STS research 
has come under fire from critics. Miller (2002) claims that Callon is right in saying that 
economists tend to project their idealised models onto reality instead of talking about the 
about the economy itself – therefore, it is up to other social scientists to say something 
substantive about the economy as such. However, according to Miller the theory Callon puts 
forth amounts to a defence of the very type of projections he argues against. In fact, rather 
than economic conceptions being framed by the material aspects of market interaction (the 
STS position), it is the other way around: The everyday materiality is given meaning because of 
the framing it receives from a specific ideological system. Without this understanding, the 
political and ideological dimension of a specific market construction can easily be lost. For 
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Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2007, 2008), current STS thinking about markets is basically an 
extension of the neoliberal project by implicitly accepting the understandings of the analysed 
market actors when the approach of Callon and others just implies a faithful reporting of what 
is being said and thought by those active in the operation of the market. In this way one risks 
unconsciously (and uncritically) adopting the language and concepts of a group of dominant 
actors. Mirowski and Nik-Khah damningly quote Callon on saying “Let us stop criticizing the 
economists” (in Barry & Slater, 2002:301), but could just as well have cited this statement: 
“Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, you had market economies, on the one hand, and 
bureaucratically planned economies, on the other hand. But now I think that we are freed of 
these dichotomies and of this opposition” (Barry & Slater, 2002:290). Now, there is only the 
market. In a similar vein, Fligstein and Dauter note that “network theorists and scholars 
interested in performativity have generally ignored the possible effects of government and 
law” in market accounts (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007:107). In my opinion, these criticisms pose a 
challenge to the performativity thesis that deserves to be taken into account for anyone 
interested in a performativity perspective on market creation.  
However, reading the critics one might get the impression that performativity theorists 
completely ignore the institutional and ideological framing of markets. This is not the case. 
MacKenzie’s An engine, not a camera is after all based almost exclusively on interviews with 
key actors who explain how they worked to change the regulatory system to accommodate 
the new options pricing theory, and while Callon and Calıskan are mainly concerned with the 
material configurations of markets, they do not reject the notion that these configurations 
arise within a setting that is socially defined: “empirical analyses of the complex relation 
between humans and non-humans […] must be encouraged and pursued” (Calıskan & Callon, 
2009:393). Similarly, they point out that markets also employ “technical and scientific 
knowledge […] as well as the competencies and skills embodied in living being” (Calıskan and 
Callon 2010:3) in addition to the list of objects mentioned above. 
 STS scholars have mostly focused on financial markets. Thus, arguably, STS theorising 
about markets is based on studies of a type of market that has enjoyed a large degree of 
autonomy from regulation the last few decades and where most actors – demand side as well 
as supply side – are professionals. However, many other types of markets are more closely 
regulated and, most importantly, the majority of actors do not have a professionalised role. 
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Rather, like in the case of the electricity market, basically all households are making decisions 
that at the end of the day affect aggregated levels of demand and thus of supply and prices. 
Consequently, the number of actors is much larger than in the case of financial markets, their 
competence in using the material objects of the market should be assumed to be lower, and 
the motives underlying demand much more related to everyday life concerns and hence 
possibly more varied than the profit motive that dominates professional markets. This has 
consequences for how we should analyse electricity markets and the implications of 
deregulation.  
One important issue could be that electricity, like energy in general, easily becomes a 
moral object due to the frequently moral character of today’s discussion about energy 
consumption. In fact, many claim that markets inherently contain a moral element: regardless 
of any wishes to keep the view of markets as simple centres of calculation and allocation of 
resources according to the preferences of market actors, their centrality to modern societies 
means that markets will inevitably be analysed in moral terms (Hausman and McPherson 
2006). This also results from the fact that the basic assumptions underlying economic theory 
have an implicit moral aspect inherent in the idea of the strictly economically rational 
consumer as the “good” consumer. Even more important is the explicit moral support for 
markets within economic discourse (Fourcade and Healy 2007). This support takes various 
forms, from arguing that trade and commerce are civilising factors (“partners in trade do not 
wage war on each other”) via arguments that markets are a necessary condition for freedom in 
other areas of politics to the current conviction that economic growth is the best (and only?) 
road to human progress. Fourcade and Healy argue that the very foundation of economics in 
its attempt to discuss the implicit (or explicit) cost of various aspects of life is basically moral: 
“[Markets] play a powerful moralizing role in practice by defining categories of worth” 
(Fourcade & Healy, 2007:301).  
Still, this observation of the moral underpinnings of markets has little to say about the 
way markets are shaped and in turn shape our interaction with them. Sociological analysis of 
markets has focused on the way markets tie into existing institutional arrangements. 
According to this tradition, there are no unfettered market forces with perfectly rational and 
perfectly informed actors operating in a friction-free world of clear preferences. Rather, the 
operation of markets relies on spoken and unspoken agreements, personal relationships, a 
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reasonable level of trust, formalised rules directing market transactions, lawmakers, industrial 
backers, and so on. In short, markets are embedded within a larger social setting (Granovetter 
1985; Zukin and DiMaggio 1990). The notion of embeddedness has, since Granovetter’s 
influential work in the 1980s,10 lead to a fruitful tradition of sociological studies of the way that 
the larger social setting enables markets to exist and influences outcomes of market 
transactions themselves (Swedberg 1994). The main idea is that one cannot give a correct 
picture of markets without considering the way formal and informal networks, government 
regulation and political institutions shape markets. This means that varying combinations of 
networks, regulations and institutions will produce different types of markets, a claim that 
goes against the grain of traditional economic theory (Dobbin 2004). The unevenness of 
market interaction posited by economic sociology goes deeper than simply saying that markets 
differ across national borders or institutional arrangements. If actors cannot know a priori 
which strategy and institutional structure will lead to an optimal outcome, they must rely on 
socially anchored scripts and conventions (Beckert 2009) to provide guidance to market 
procedures. These conventions reduce uncertainty and lend some stability to a fundamentally 
unstable arrangement, but also pose a specific challenge to accounts of these markets to 
accurately describe and analyse what is going on in a specific market setting. This challenge 
poses a plethora of questions to tackle for sociologists, as indeed they have: What institutions 
created and sustain markets (Fligstein 2001), what networks are the actors involved in 
(Dimaggio and Louch 1998), what are the rules of engagement (Edelman and Stryker 2005), 
and where do actors’ preferences come from (Bourdieu 2005)? These are just some of the 
questions of interest to the economic sociologist, and they point to the core of the problem, 
namely that seeking to avoid simplification by necessity breeds complication. The increased 
focus on the wider social context market interactions happen within means that market 
descriptions become more singular and less useful for cross-contextual analysis. In turn, this 
complicates the analysis of deregulation, which in the face of such observations should be 
taken to be a diverse phenomenon. 
As with performativity, embeddedness is not without its critics. Some claim that it fails 
to actually integrate markets in the social setting, instead keeping it as an entity separate from 
larger society (Krippner 2001). Krippner claims that by focussing on the surrounding context 
                                                          
10 Which itself draws on, but does not seek to supplant, one of the classics of economic sociology, Karl 
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation. 
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economic sociology has, like the economists it often criticises, taken the market for granted. 
Gemici (2007) argues that embeddedness as a concept has value as a methodological 
approach in that it guides scholars towards the ways markets connect to the larger societal 
context, but that this achievement is also the reason why the embeddedness approach fails to 
provide an alternative to prevailing economic thought. The market is still a separate bubble, 
even if it now bobbing in society’s bathtub rather than floating in a vacuum. Or, using a 
different metaphor: “why, we ask, does the sharp edge of embeddedness when used against 
neoclassical economics become a blunt instrument when deployed within economic 
sociology?” (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007:221). This is a conundrum that economic sociology has 
yet to solve, as witnessed by the latest attempt to tackle the concept (Dale 2011).11 However, 
there may still be some gain in employing the embeddedness perspective to the analysis of the 
deregulated Norwegian market as an alternative to the performativity approach.  
 Much of the difference between the STS/performativity and economic sociology 
approaches to markets lies in their focus: performativity represents a concern with theories 
and their material outcomes, embeddedness with theories and their institutional 
representations. Pinch and Swedberg (2008) argue for a synthesis of these two perspectives, a 
material embeddedness, while making it clear that they see the material part of the equation 
as the most important concern. Maybe this could be turned around? Considering some of the 
criticism levied against performativity (Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2008; Mirowski and Nik-Khah 
2007; Fligstein and Dauter 2007), perhaps we should explore an action approach. Maybe the 
synthesis of performativity and embeddedness should redress the obvious lack of actors’ 
perspective in both cases? In this manner, markets would be understood as socio-technical 
enactments with room for social and political strategies employed by human actors in market 
interactions (institutions, habits, morals etc.). 
 To develop such a perspective, several types of questions must be asked. For example, 
what work is required to transform economic theory into practice and embed theory and 
practice in social relationships, and who does this work? What is the relationship between 
economists and other actors? What material and human actors shape supply and demand 
strategies? What compromises are involved in deregulation activites? The four papers included 
                                                          
11 Indeed, Dale suggests that there might be something to gain from adopting the more Marxian view 
that society is embedded in the economy rather than the other way around. 
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in the dissertation attempt to engage with these questions, but only partially. What new 
insights may be gained from a cross-cutting analysis?  
Cross-cutting analysis: beyond performativity and embeddedness 
Doubtless, the performativity perspective developed by Michel Callon and others introduces a 
research agenda well worth exploring. On the other hand, the analysis in the four papers in 
this dissertation shows that the performativity perspective, especially the strong version 
where theory is taken to do all the work on its own, cannot account for the observations 
related to the deregulation of the Norwegian electricity market. When deregulation is framed 
from the point of view of (strong) performativity, each of the four papers observe a particular 
form of overflow – to use Callon’s (1998) own term – that critically questions the framing. 
Paper 1 shows how the profession of economists and their political machinery played a vital 
role in making a theoretical economic design into an actually deregulated electricity market. 
Performativity theory externalises such influence, without which deregulation would never 
have happened. In paper 2, we examine how policy-makers resist and transcend the effort to 
frame deregulation as a purified application of economic theory. The efforts to externalise 
moral concerns fails, producing a second overflow. A similar overflow is observed in paper 3, 
which shows how environmental concerns seem more important to induce electricity saving 
activities than economic motives. The framing of users of electricity as consumers mainly fails 
because too many other concerns than economics ones overflows the economic human 
framing. Rationality is more complex. Finally, in paper 4, we observe how the framing of the 
electricity market as deregulated and thus beyond politics is overflowed because a host of 
public actors denies the externalisation of political responsibility with respect to security of 
supply of electricity. 
 The embeddedness perspective was not explicitly tried out in any of the four papers, 
but with reference to the discussion above it does not add much to the topic being studied. 
The findings in paper 1 could be interpreted similarly to the performativity claim, namely that 
actors’ strategies were important and not just an articulation of an institutional logic. Paper 2 
observes what could be interpreted as a failure of embeddedness, due to political conflict. Also 
paper 3 suggests a failure of embedding deregulation among the large social network of 
household users of electricity, while the observations in paper 4 move beyond those made 
relevant by an embeddedness perspective. Thus, let us return to the ambition of synthesis. 
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As I stated in the introduction, market deregulation relies on an economic design. Such 
designs may be seen as technologies of governance that carry with them implicit assumptions 
about how it should be implemented and used. In fact, examining deregulation as a political or 
intellectual technology can offer a fruitful exploration of some of the common themes of the 
four papers of the dissertation. As a study of a design, the analysis can demonstrate how 
policies carry with them a specific set of moral instructions that must be followed for them to 
work. It can also, however, go some way towards showing how the performativity thesis has 
moved a little away from the more traditional STS analyses of science and technology by 
refusing to critically examine the theories put forward by scientists, as well as overlooking the 
importance of how users relate to such theories. 
 Traditionally, science and technology studies have analysed the design of technology 
by referring to the built-in instructions of technological designs as scripts or programs that are 
inscribed into the technology by the designer (Akrich 1992). These instructions are 
prescriptions about how the technology should be used that the designer tries to build into the 
design, in a way making choices on behalf of the users of the technology. The roles prescribed 
by scripts are not set in stone, however. After the design leaves the hands of the designer, its 
inbuilt script can be resisted by the end user, who to varying degrees stands free to modify or 
simply discard the functional vision of the designer. In the parlance of STS, they produce an 
anti-program to counter the original program (Akrich and Latour 1992). The concept of script 
can be one way of summing up the underlying theme in the four papers I present here. For 
example, the experts and politicians involved in the construction of the deregulation policy had 
a clear understanding of how the deregulated market would achieve economic efficiency, as I 
observe in the first papers. Paper 1 demonstrates how economists built a theoretical model for 
the design of a new free market for electricity, using the basic assumptions of the dominant 
economic theories of the day. The scripting inherent in this process was the adoption of a 
specific type of economic rationality that would ensure the efficiency of the new market 
construction, based on consumers’ willingness and ability to monitor their electricity 
consumption and the price differences between electricity suppliers. The script could be 
observed above all from the incentives to encourage homo economicus behaviour. 
Paper 2 shows how politicians debated the effect of the reform on the behaviour of 
electricity users, with the party block in government at the time arguing that households 
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would benefit greatly from the chance to switch between suppliers. The underlying rationality 
was that competitive prices would provide consumers with the incentives they needed to use 
electricity in the most economically efficient way and thus induce saving. At the same time, 
this paper observes that the scripting was controversial, that there actually was a competing 
moral script, which was not implemented. Moreover, as paper 3 demonstrates, electricity 
users are not particularly market oriented, and do not necessarily subscribe to a purely 
economic rationality. The findings indicate that people are well aware of the possibility of 
comparing prices and are knowledgeable when it comes to the general price level of 
electricity, but that they generally choose not to interact much with the electricity market, 
hunting for better deals. In fact, to the degree that consumers use electricity in a less wasteful 
manner it is probably more due to a different, more environmentally oriented kind of 
rationality than an economic one. Consequently, the homo economicus script is overlooked or 
resisted. This suspicion is strengthened by the media debate I discuss in paper 4, which shows 
a lot of opposition to the current electricity regime, even if it seems to be working exactly to 
plan. While a (continued and heated) debate over the handling of a situation of regional supply 
deficit does not necessarily imply that there is widespread discontentment over the electricity 
market itself, it does indicate that not everything seems to go according to script.  
Taken together, these papers also demonstrate a need to operate with a larger 
diversity of rationalities, of which strictly economic rationality is only one. On the one hand, 
this points to a need to be concerned with a greater diversity of calculating devices being 
present in the deregulated electricity market. The material underpinnings of the market seem 
more complex than performativity theory would have us believe. On the other hand, we are 
reminded that markets may need to become embedded – or, more precisely, made part of – 
the political contexts from which actors develop their strategies to engage with for example 
deregulation. 
The script concept has more to offer as a tool of analysing political (economic) designs. 
For example, there are clearly moral imperatives inherent in technological scripts, as Akrich 
(1992) and Latour (1992) make clear in their studies of how users of solar-panel lighting are 
not allowed to alter the lamps or how cars make annoying noises until the passenger puts on a 
seatbelt. The main point is nevertheless not that technology is morally imbued, but that 
designs embody strong affordances with respect to how people should act in specific 
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situations. This is not only analogous to the morality of markets discussed in the theory section 
(Fourcade and Healy 2007), but as paper 2 demonstrates there is also a clear morality at work 
in the construction of government policy. Politicians of all stripes repeatedly appeal to the 
moral obligation of using electricity efficiently. Among its supporters, the deregulated market 
was seen as an instrument of achieving this, while the opposition is more concerned with the 
potentially damaging effects of allowing uncontrolled consumption of electricity. Similarly, the 
findings from the consumer survey of paper 3 show that people affix morality to their actions 
on the electricity market, even when it is clear that Norwegian electricity is clean. One function 
of this morality is that it enables later judgment over the course of things: “Because roles and 
responsibilities are allocated, accusations and trials tend to follow” (Akrich, 1992:219). 
Whether it is the electricity users or the policy-makers who are responsible for making the 
electricity use efficient becomes an issue of contention. The different discourse coalitions in 
the media debate discussed in paper 4, especially the Blame Alliance, echo this point. A large 
number of the actors in the debate engaged in the assignment of blame for the electricity 
supply deficit rather than propose specific solutions, a sign that the type of morality discussed 
here played a part in the controversy. 
Another reason to bring up the script concept here is that it is an example of an 
approach that has been central to the field of STS since the 1980s. The idea is that complex 
systems of policy, scientific expertise and technology should be studied by moving between 
the various parts of the system: the designers, the users and those responsible for the framing 
the context of design and use. This way, no single perspective is allowed to dominate the 
analysis. The four papers in this thesis are in line with this approach through their diversity of 
perspective. Not only those who design a policy are studied but also those who implement it 
and the diverse actors of the new market construction, above all the suppliers and the 
household customers of electricity. In light of this, the performativity thesis appears as an 
ironic new development of STS theory. True, as I show in paper 1 on economisation, 
performativity is an interesting inroad to study the influence of scientific (economic) expertise 
on policy matters, but something seems lost on the way. Rather than resist the tendency – 
often criticised by STS – of presenting scientific knowledge as something that comes into the 
world as a complete package, performativity takes economic theory as a given and studies its 
effects instead. This is unsatisfactory. 
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In a way, performativity seems to be a part of an intervention in the sociological study 
of science. Callon and Calıskan are preoccupied with what they see as sociology’s tendency to 
“sociologise” all the phenomena it comes across, making itself into the “queen of disciplines” 
(Calıskan & Callon, 2009:381). This, they claim, achieves nothing more than transforming the 
problem of how to analyse market into the problem of how to analyse society, a much fuzzier 
concept. This may be a valid critique of the embeddedness approach, but as we have seen, the 
argument is less helpful than asserted. The main reason is the lack of reference to a theory of 
action, shared by post-structuralist performativity theory and structuralist embeddedness 
theory alike.  
Performativity theory should be credited for making economic theory into an object 
that – together with a host of other material objects – is part of the socio-technical 
construction of markets. Deregulation is clearly an effort to redesign exchanges of for example 
electricity, and thus may be considered to be a socio-technical development. However, it is a 
central tenet of STS approaches that such developments are in the hands of the users, be they 
policy-makers, producers of electricity or consumers. While this would not be overlooked by 
such concepts as scripts or programmes, it seems to be lacking in recent developments within 
the field. I believe this perspective deserves to be re-introduced into the theoretical fold of 
STS. 
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Methodology 
In this section I present the type of methods I have used to gather data and analyse it. It is a 
more over-arching presentation of the methodological considerations behind the choices I 
have made in the course of my work with this thesis, and the specific details on the methods 
used are relegated to the four papers in the back. Studying the deregulation of the Norwegian 
electricity system presents some challenges when it comes to choice of methodology. These 
challenges are related to the sheer amount of information about a very large, very public 
process lasting for more than two decades, but also to the complexity of the system involved. 
As Dür (2008) notes when discussing the challenges of measuring the influence of various 
policy groups within the EU, one way to study a large complex of issues is to use different 
methods on a variety of phenomena related to the larger issue, what he calls “method-
shopping”, in order to capture some of the complexity. The point is that it is impossible to 
capture this kind of complexity with a single methodological approach, hence the need to shop 
around, applying methods across the whole spectrum in order to attack an issue from several 
angles. If this is done with a sufficiently large amount of data, the advantages to such an 
approach will outweigh the disadvantages of not having a uniform methodology. I find 
“method-shopping” to be a good description of my approach in this thesis, and believe I have 
gathered enough data to support my claims regarding the deregulation process that is the 
subject here. The concept has a lot in common with the well-known idea of methods 
triangulation, but to me triangulation has the feel of something too controlled, too closed-in-
advance for a constantly evolving project.  
Any study of this size must necessarily make some hard choices, as there is no room to 
include everything that could have some relevance to the questions at hand. One way of 
informing these choices can be found in the theoretical framework of the study. Since it makes 
use of perspectives from the fields of STS and economic sociology, this has consequences for 
choice of methods. On the one hand, it discusses the influence of economists and economic 
theory on the deregulation of the electricity market, making it natural to spend some time 
both on the way economic theory is formulated in relevant policy documents and public and 
political debate of these as well as the work done by economists to promote the theory. On 
the other hand, I try to maintain a focus on how those affected by the deregulation reform 
interact with various aspects of the electricity system, for example by examining how 
electricity users relate to the new free market for electricity or in what way politicians deal 
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with problems in the supply system. Similarly, it is important to remember that the type of 
political work the deregulation requires does not stop at any given time, but rather is a 
continuing effort to produce and maintain deregulation. Consequently, a study of a process 
rather than a specific point in time must take into account some of the elements preceding the 
deregulation, such as the work laid down by experts and political actors in order to make it a 
reality. Similarly, as the deregulation is now twenty years old, not giving some description of 
how things have developed since would greatly limit the value of the project. 
Extended networks are immensely complex, but as a system the electricity market is 
extraordinarily so. It touches in some way nearly all human activity. All households participate 
in the market, as well as all industry and enterprise. It is one of the central infrastructures of 
modern society, and as such an important matter of concern for many different societal 
groups. Not having a very direct relationship with electricity is nearly inconceivable, at least in 
the richer part of the world. In dealing with such complexity, Urry advocates combining a 
systems and a process oriented approach, entering into “a dialogical engagement with 
involved social actors seeking to transform social systems” (Urry 2005:10). In this work, I 
analyse four separate (and yet connected) aspects of the electricity system. They are only a 
small fraction of all the possible entry points into the subject of electricity deregulation, and 
yet they are different enough to warrant very differing treatment. The four aspects can be 
described as the institutional aspect, the framing aspect, the user aspect and the public aspect. 
The institutional aspect deals with how the legal and political framework for a policy 
comes to have the shape it has. Looking at the political process before and during the 
deregulation, I interview politicians and experts who worked on the deregulation itself about 
their role in the process, including legal and economic experts’ opinions on the way the system 
functions now. The goal was to see what the prime movers and shakers of an important 
political change thought the meaning of this change was supposed to be - what was its point? 
This is a traditional approach, identifying key stakeholders and unravelling their stories of what 
transpired. I have, together with a colleague, conducted interviews with 15 experts, politicians 
and public servants engaged in the deregulation process or its aftermath. These interviews, 
which are qualitative and semi-structured, are used in the paper on economisation to examine 
the thinking behind the design of the electricity market.  
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Effecting large scale change requires a lot of work, not least in regular electricity users’ 
mental adjustment to now being consumers of a good like any other. The second aspect I 
examine is the way official government documents and parliamentary debates try to frame 
this new entity, the consumer, in order to transform them from recipients of a public service to 
shoppers of electricity. While this is very hard to pinpoint with any accuracy, looking at how 
consumers are constructed as moral subjects (are they wasteful or careful, do good consumers 
conserve electricity or buy a lot of it? These questions are also discussed in Fourcade & Healy 
(2007)) gives an insight into how the market as such is seen as a system from those responsible 
for putting it into place. I have done a review of government white papers and legal 
preparatory notes from the first period of energy efficiency legislation in the 1970s to the last 
such discussion in Parliament in 2006, and subjected these to a standard document analysis. 
These are used primarily in the paper on governmental constructions of consumers, but also to 
some degree in the paper on the supply deficit of Mid-Norway. 
The two aspects mentioned so far have in a way been easy to pin down, as they deal 
with institutional configurations that have to be considered when attempting an analysis of a 
system. Other aspects, such as the role of users of electricity, are more difficult to grasp. The 
first challenge is figuring out what is unique about the consumer relation to the deregulated 
electricity market. How to get to their understanding of their own relation to the new free 
market for electricity? In order to map out how electricity users make sense of the situation of 
choosing electricity supplier on a free market, I have with the help of a call centre conducted a 
consumer survey containing a series of questions about their market behaviour. It deals with 
everything from how often they change electricity utility to their thoughts on what an 
acceptable price for electricity is to what the ideal level of government intervention in a 
necessity market should be. The survey is a representative, quantitative survey of 1500 
Norwegian electricity users and their preferences and attitudes relating to the market for 
electricity. Using the survey data, I construct an index of Norwegian electricity users’ market 
orientation and run an ordinary least squares regression analysis against a set of background 
variables to examine in what way electricity users can be said to have learned to act according 
to the expectations of the market designers. This type of study is by no means comprehensive, 
but it does offer a way of accessing everyday opinions and self-reported behaviour that is not 
easily discovered through interviews, media analysis or direct observation. 
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The public aspect has to do with how the public understands the rationale and effect 
of deregulation. In order to examine how potential problems with a deregulated system are 
made into public issues, I have done an analysis of the media debate concerning what was 
dubbed the “electricity crisis” of the Mid-Norway region, a sudden and large rise in electricity 
prices. This paper is mainly based on a reading of 341 newspaper articles about the so-called 
“electricity crisis” of Mid-Norway in the period 2001-2007. Following issues of public debate is 
not simple, but I landed on an analysis with a basis in discourse analysis. Although this 
approach can have some problematic implications, most importantly the tendency to see 
discourse as an obfuscating strategy for what actors really mean, I believe looking at the 
statements made by actors in public media to be a valuable resource for anyone seeking to 
understand the various positions on political matters. The reason for choosing a reading of the 
media discourse is not to prove that there is necessarily anything wrong with the deregulated 
market as seen from an economic point of view, but rather to examine what happens when a 
supposedly self-preserving system designed to function without political intervention runs into 
politically charged problems. Can the deregulation stand up to public debate about the high 
prices of electricity? 
These four aspects of the electricity system are by no means all there is to this system. 
Ideally, the large industrial buyers of electricity should be represented to give their account of 
the adjustments to negotiating new types of electricity contracts. Likewise, the technical 
aspects of deregulation – how grid investments are handled, for example, or what increased 
international transmissions mean for transfer capabilities – should be explored. And the 
bureaucracy in charge of upholding the rules and regulations. And the anti-trust competition 
authorities, and the international treaty negotiaters, and so forth. Similarly, there is nothing to 
say that these methodological approaches are the only (or the best) fit for studying just those 
aspects I have chosen. Consumers can be interviewed in focus groups or studied using 
household electricity consumption statistics, political processes can be examined through 
documentary analysis, public debate can go through many different channels and the thoughts 
of politicians can be expressed in interviews as well as parliamentary debates. The list can go 
on almost indefinitely, but in the end there are always constraints that make exhaustive 
accounts impossible. In my cases, I feel I have obtained valuable information that informs my 
analysis of the system as a whole. 
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Chapter 2: Economisation – between economics and economists 
 
This paper explores the new theoretical concept of economisation – the view that more and 
more parts of society are considered to be natural objects by economic analysis and governed 
accordingly – and its possible application to specific empirical contexts. Looking at the 
deregulation of the Norwegian electricity sector as a possible economisation case, I discuss to 
what degree it fits the bill and whether economisation is a fruitful concept for studying 
economic policy processes. 
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Chapter 3: Consumers as professional and political constructions. 
On the performativity of energy economics 
 
Henrik Karlstrøm, Knut H. Sørensen, Åsne L. Godbolt 
 
The paper discusses Michel Callon’s theory of the performativity of economics, the idea that 
economic theory shapes economic action so that it comes to resemble the original theoretical 
assumptions. It does so by examining the way in which Norwegian policy-makers have 
domesticated economic theory when dealing with official policy for energy efficiency in 
households and the economic efficiency of the energy system. We examine government white 
papers and corresponding parliamentary debates and legal documents to see in what way 
Norwegian households have been conceptualised in relation to the market behaviour 
anticipated by economic theory and the relative role of professional economic knowledge and 
political experience. We observe how the construction of energy users changes over the course 
of three particular phases of Norwegian energy efficiency policy and how the various 
constructions elicit different controversies among policy-makers, and conclude that Norwegian 
energy policy-makers have engaged in the making of ambiguous, vague and shifting 
constructions of consumers and their anticipated market behaviour. The findings do not 
support any strong versions of the performativity of economic theory. While economists played 
a vital role in designing a deregulated market for electricity in Norway, only for a while did a 
majority of policy-makers trust the new calculation devices of a liberalised market to achieve a 
balance of supply and demand in the way economic theory assumes. 
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Chapter 4: From user to consumer? How households’ use of 
electricity is affected by market deregulation and environmental 
concerns 
 
Henrik Karlstrøm and Marianne Ryghaug 
 
What has been the effect of deregulation of the market for electricity on households' use of 
electricity and their ways of relating to the market? Does deregulation make households more 
market conscious in the sense that they are more concerned with price differences among 
suppliers? How do price issues affect energy efficiency activities, compared to environmental 
concerns? This paper addresses these issues, based on a representative survey of Norwegian 
households. A main finding is that the majority of the households only to a small extent enact 
the role of market conscious consumers as envisioned in economic theory. This means that the 
effect of 20 years of deregulation has not taught households to become consumers. Also, 
households that actually say they take on the active role of a market-oriented consumer of 
electricity are not significantly more interested in energy efficiency measures. Rather, the 
interest in energy efficiency seems more strongly motivated by environmental concerns. 
 
Keywords: Market behaviour, deregulation, electricity consumption, environmental concerns, 
social learning 
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Chapter 5: When a deregulated electricity system faces a supply 
deficit: A never-ending story of inaction? 
 
Following the first waves of deregulation of electricity markets that took place in the early 
1990s, most of Europe’s electricity has been deregulated. This has provoked interest in how 
deregulated markets handle issues of security of supply and large fluctuations in demand. This 
paper examines the debate over an electricity supply deficit in a region of Norway, one of the 
first countries to deregulate their market. Using theoretical frameworks from discourse analysis 
combined with recent theories about market framings from the sociology of markets, I discuss 
how a furious debate over what is perceived as an «electricity crisis» can go on for a decade 
with no apparent solution. Even when alleviating measures are taken with some success, this 
does not quell the debate. Instead, a circle of blaming and procrastination continues. 
 
Keywords: Deregulation, electricity supply deficit, discourse coalition 
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